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ABSTRACT 
Over the past several decades, China has made tremendous progress in market integration and 
infrastructure development. Demand for natural resources has increased from the booming coastal 
economies, causing the terms of trade to favor the resource sector, which is predominantly based in the 
interior regions of the country. However, the gap in economic development level between the coastal and 
inland regions has widened significantly. In this paper, using a panel data set at the provincial level, we 
show that Chinese provinces with abundant resources perform worse than their resource-poor 
counterparts in terms of per capita consumption growth. This trend that resource-poor areas are better off 
than resource-rich areas is particularly prominent in rural areas. Because of the institutional arrangements 
regarding property rights of natural resources, most gains from the resource boom have been captured 
either by the government or state owned enterprises. Thus, the windfall of natural resources has more to 
do with government consumption than household consumption. Moreover, in resource-rich areas, greater 
revenues accrued from natural resources bid up the price of non-tradable goods and hurt the 
competitiveness of the local economy.   
Keywords: China; regional inequality; resource curse; Dutch disease; property rights   1
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Over the past several decades, China has made tremendous progress in market integration and 
infrastructure development (Bai et al., 2004; Fan and Chang-Kan, 2005; Zhang and Tan, 2007). Market 
reforms have eased restrictions on the flows of products, labor, and capital. The newly built inter-
provincial highway system provides better transport links between regions and promotes trade flow. 
Rapid productivity growth has lowered the price of manufactured goods and led to soaring demand for 
raw materials, which are supplied by the natural resource-abundant interior regions. As shown in Figure 
1, the terms of trade have shifted in favor of the resource sector. Given this situation—increasing market 
integration, better transport systems, and more favorable terms of trade—growth theory predicts regional 
convergence. However, the gap in living standards between the coastal and inland regions has widened 
(Kanbur and Zhang, 1999, 2005), as shown in Table 1. Various explanations to this puzzle have been put 
forward, including agglomeration, biased development policy, decentralization, and globalization 
(Démurger et al., 2001; Hu, 2002; Zhang and Zhang, 2003; Zhang, 2006). However, few studies have 
examined the link between natural resource endowment and the imbalance in regional development 
patterns in China.
1 
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Natural resources serve as important capital in economic development. In principle, revenues 
generated from the natural resource sector should be good for the economy. However, many resource-rich 
countries have worse economic performance than their resource-poor counterparts, a phenomenon known 
as the “resource curse.” In the present study, we seek to link the two strands of the literature on regional 
                                                 
1Xu and Wang (2006) is one of the few Chinese papers we have found on this topic.     2
 
inequality and resource curse to explain the rapidly increasing inequality between resource-rich and 
resource-poor regions in China from the viewpoint of the resource curse.  
In this study, we make use of a provincial-level panel data set from China. The unique 
characteristics of China make it particularly suitable for testing whether natural resource abundance has a 
statistically significant negative impact on economic development. First, the institutional and governance 
structures are rather homogeneous across provinces. Second, in terms of population and geographic size, 
many Chinese provinces are as large as countries and there are large regional variations in terms of 
resource endowment and development. The homogeneous institutional structure and large temporal and 
spatial variations enable us to better identify the effect of natural resources on growth and distribution.
2  
The results show that provinces with abundant resource wealth grow slower than their resource-
poor counterparts in terms of per capita consumption, particularly in rural areas. We explain this 
phenomenon primarily from the perspective of property rights. Due to the arrangement of property rights 
on natural resources, local residents, in particular farmers, do not enjoy a fair share of the rise in rents 
associated with the booming natural resource sector. Most rents go to the government and state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs). Moreover, greater revenues accrued from natural resources lead to increased prices 
for non-tradable goods and hurt the competitiveness of local economies.   
The next section offers empirical evidence of the negative impact of resource abundance on 
consumption growth. Section 3 analyzes the transmission channels of natural resources. Finally, in 
Section 4 we present our conclusions and explore policy implications. The data used in the analysis are 
described in the Appendix.   
                                                 
2In spirit, the paper echoes the work of Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2007), who examine resource abundance and regional 
economic growth by making use of state level data in the United States.     3
 






















Inland 1985  625  310  248  72.2  59.1  45.8  979  15.7 
 2005  3,497  1,046  696 77.7  56.4  36.5  1,926  5.5 
  Annual growth rate (%)  9.0  6.3  5.3  0.4  –0.2  –1.1  3.6  –5.4 
                  
Coast 1985  1,069  396  318  27.8  40.9  54.2  546  5.1 
 2005  7,857  1,766  1,063  22.3  43.6  63.5  715  0.9 
   Annual growth rate (%)  10.5  7.8  6.2  –1.2  0.3  0.8  1.4  –8.7 
Note: Calculated by authors. The units of per capita GDP and consumption are in 1985 yuan.   
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2.    IS THERE A RESOURCE CURSE IN CHINA?   
The cross-country empirical growth literature has shown mixed evidence to support the curse of natural 
resources. By looking at the period of 1970–1989 when oil prices plummeted, Sachs and Warner (2001) 
show strong empirical support for the hypothesis. However, if the period is extended to a later time, the 
findings do not hold (Auty, 2001). In addition, it is hard to control for institutional factors and rigorously 
test the hypothesis in a strictly controlled environment for cross-country data sets. When institutional 
factors are accounted for, the direct negative impact of resource abundance vanishes (Bulte, Damania, and 
Deacon, 2005; Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik, 2006).  
Due to the large size of Chinese provinces and homogenous governance structures, China 
provides a good test ground for examining whether the resource curse is a real phenomenon. Following 
the spirit of Sachs and Warner (2001), Figure 2 plots per capita GDP growth from 1985 to 2005 against a 
resource intensity variable, namely the ratio of resource production to total GDP in 1985.
3 Resource 
production is defined as the total standard energy units of coal, oil, natural gas, and hydraulic power. See 
the Appendix for details on the data sources. The figure shows a negative link between natural resource 
abundance in 1985 and the growth rate of per capita GDP in the following two decades. Most provinces 
with rapid growth started as resource poor, such as Zhejiang Province, while resource rich provinces, such 
as Guizhou, Shanxi and Heilongjiang, grow slower than average. Figures 3 and 4 reveal the same 
negative associations of resource abundance with change in per capita consumption and poverty.
4 These 
findings thus suggest that resource abundance is more closely related to per capita consumption growth 
than to GDP growth.   
The bivariate plots in Figures 2–4 show a negative relationship between the resource intensity 
variable and several outcome variables. However this finding should be viewed with caution, as 
confounding variables may have given rise to the observed negative association. For example, the 
negative correlation may be due to geographic factors, because most natural resources are produced in 
remote areas. That is, the remoteness of the production site rather than the resource abundance may be the 
causal factor. Therefore, multivariate analysis must be used to control for key variables.   
                                                 
3Ideally, we should use resource stocks as a measure of resource abundance. However, systematic stock data at the 
provincial level are not available for the resource variables used in this paper.   
4The vertical axis label in Fig.4 is only for 1988–1999 as opposed to the other 1985–2005 data in Figs. 2 and 3.   5
Figure 2.    GDP Growth and Resource Abundance 
 
Note: The resource intensity variable is in logarithmic form.   
Before undertaking more rigorous quantitative analyses, we first briefly review the history of 
price reform in China’s natural resource sector.
5  In the planned economic era (1949–1978), the state 
artificially set low prices for minerals and other natural resources to support the manufacturing sector, 
which largely consisted of SOEs and was concentrated in resource-poor provinces. Since 1978, China has 
implemented a series of price reforms. From 1979 to 1984, the general price reform focused on lifting 
controls on consumer prices. The state, on realizing that low energy prices hindered supply, the price was 
increased on three separate occasions, in the period of 1979–1983. In 1984, the state permitted 
collectively owned and local government-owned coal mines to sell coal at the market price.   
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Figure 3.    Consumption Growth and Resource Abundance 
 
Note: The resource intensity variable is in logarithmic form.   
A milestone in price reform occurred in 1985, when a dual-track system was put in place. Prior to 
this reform, SOEs under the control of the central, provincial, or municipal governments, enjoyed 
privileged access to a variety of scarce materials through quotas. There were few quotas, however, for 
other lower-level SOEs and even fewer for collectively owned enterprises. The dual pricing system 
allowed SOEs to sell unused input quota at market price to township and village enterprises, which were 
outside the command economy. This dual-track system presented a price-discovery mechanism. The 
planned and market prices gradually converged. By 1993, the coal price was largely liberalized, except 
for the portion earmarked for electricity generation, which was still subject to state price control and 
accounted for about 30% of total output. In October 1993, the state introduced a dual-track system for 
crude oil production. Under this system, crude oil produced outside the state quota could be sold at the 
market price. On May 1, 1994, the state raised the planned price for crude oil to bring it into line with the 
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Figure 4.    Change in Poverty and Resource Abundance 
 
Note: The resource intensity variable is in logarithmic form.   
In summary, there has been a continuous process of price liberalization from the late 1970s to the 
mid-1990s in China. Under the price control regimes in place during this period, the resource curse may 
have resulted from China’s heavy industrial-oriented development strategies and may have had little to do 
with the traditional resource curse. Only after reforms, when the energy price reflected market supply and 
demand, did the original interpretation of the resource curse discussed in the literature become relevant to 
China. Therefore, in our analyses presented below, we not only cover the whole sample period of 1985–
2005, but also the sub-period of 1995–2005, during which energy and raw material prices were 
liberalized.
6  
As a first step, we examine the link between resource abundance and several outcome variables 
for the whole period and the post-price liberalization period using cross-provincial data (Table 2). The 
upper panel reports the regression results for the whole period of 1985–2005, while the lower panel lists 
the results obtained when the same regressions were repeated for the post-price liberalization period of 
1995–2005. The regressions estimate the relationship between historical resource abundance and the 
growth in outcome variables conditional on the initial value of the dependent variable. The outcome 
                                                 
6China did not publish energy production data by province until 1985. The rural poverty data at the provincial level provided 
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Resource intensity in 1985  8
variables include the change in the logarithmic values of per capita GDP, per capita consumption, per 
capita rural consumption, and the change in rural poverty incidence. The regressors include the logarithm 
of the initial value of the dependent and resource intensity variables. The initial value of the dependent 
variable can help capture the mean reversion property of most economic variables. A negative coefficient 
for the variable suggests growth convergence across provinces. The resource intensity is defined as the 
ratio of resource production to total GDP in the first year of the sample period.   
For the whole period of 1985–2005 (upper panel, Table 2), the coefficient for the resource 
variable is negative and statistically significant in all four regressions, providing tentative evidence in 
support of the presence of a resource curse. For the post-price liberalization period (lower panel, Table 2), 
by contrast, the coefficient for the resource variable is only significant in the regression on rural 
consumption growth. However, given the potential problem of omitted variables in cross-sectional 
regressions, this finding is only suggestive. It seems that the results are not robust to the sample period 
covered.  
With only 25 observations, it is difficult to add more control variables to test the robustness of the 
results more rigorously.
7  To overcome this constraint, we divide the two-decade period into four five-
year sub-periods and create a panel data set with 100 observations. The resulting larger data set enables us 
to control for more factors by taking advantage of the panel structure. 
Table 2.    The Impact of Resource Intensity on Change in Several Outcome Variables from 1985 to 











1985–2005        
Initial value  0.099  –0.079  –0.201  –0.033 
 (0.67)  (0.31)  (0.66)  (3.02)*** 
Resource intensity  –0.130  –0.109  –0.106  0.446 
 (3.98)***  (3.54)***  (3.19)***  (2.65)** 
Adjusted R-squared  0.289  0.120  0.080  0.331 
        
1995–2005        
Initial value  –0.04  0.091  0.035   
 (0.42)  (0.83)  (0.30)   
Resource intensity  –0.023  –0.028  –0.036   
 (0.99)  (1.49)  (2.48)**   
Adjusted R-squared  –0.058  0.066  0.078    
Note: Robust t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Due to a lack of data, 
the rural poverty regression is from 1988 to 1999. 
                                                 
7Due to a lack of data, Tibet, Hainan, and Chongqing are not included. In addition, the three principal cities, Beijing, 
Shanghai and Tianjing, are excluded from our analysis on account of their special status and negligible natural resource base. The 
main results remain the same if these areas are included.     9
Table 3 presents the estimated results on the link between resource abundance and per capita GDP growth 
obtained using the above panel data set for six distinct specifications. Once again, we run the regressions 
for the whole period (1985–2005) and the post-price liberalization period (1995–2005). In all the 
specifications, we include year dummy variables to control for time-specific effects. The resource 
intensity variable is defined as the ratio of resource production to comparable GDP in the initial year of 
each panel period.
8  The terms of trade variable is defined as the ratio of the fuel price index to the overall 
retail price index used in 1985 as a base.
9  Due to the location-specific nature of resource variables, we 
cannot add provincial dummy variables, which are highly correlated with the resource intensity variable, 
in the regressions.   
The independent variables in the first regression include the initial value of per capita GDP, the 
resource intensity, and the change in the terms of trade for the resource sector. For the whole period 
(upper panel, Table 3), the resource intensity variable has a significant negative coefficient, indicating the 
possible existence of the resource curse. The coefficient for the terms of trade variable is also statistically 
significant. For the post-price liberalization period (lower panel, Table 3), however, neither the coefficient 
for the resource intensity variable, nor that for the terms of trade variable, is significant.   
In the second regression, the coastal dummy variable is added to capture potentially omitted 
variables, such as the geographic advantage of the coast along with globalization and coast-biased 
development policies. In the third regression, we replace the coastal dummy variable with explicit 
geographic (the share of population living within 100 kilometers from the coast) and policy variables 
taken from Démurger et al. (2001). When these variables are included, the coefficient for the resource 
intensity variable is nonsignificant for both the whole period and the post-price liberalization period. In 
China, most natural resources are concentrated in the inland regions. As a result, the resource variable is 
highly associated with the coastal dummy, geographic, and policy variables mentioned above.
10The 
resultant multicollinearity problem poses a challenge to empirically disentangle the impact of resource 
abundance.  
                                                 
8Sachs and Warner (2001) argue that the share of resource production in GDP is a better measure than per capita resource 
production as it captures the importance of natural resources in the economy. Nonetheless, to test the robustness of our results, 
we also perform all the regressions in Tables 2-5 using alternative measures of resource intensity, including per capita resource 
production in 1985, per capita resource production in the initial year of each panel period, and the ratio of resource production to 
GDP in 1985. The basic findings are the same. The detailed regressions are available upon request.   
9We also use the ratio of the fuel price index to the GDP deflator at the provincial level as an alterative measure. The results 
are similar.   
10Its correlation coefficients with the coastal dummy, share of population within 100 km from coast, and policy variables are 
-0.46, -0.50, and -0.63, respectively.     10
Table 3.    Per Capita GDP Growth and Resource Abundance 
  R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 
1985–2005        
Initial  per  capita  GDP  0.037 0.028 0.028 0.039 0.034 0.033 
  (2.99)*** (2.09)**  (1.89)*  (3.21)*** (2.24)**  (2.38)** 
Resource intensity  –0.019  –0.012  –0.012  0.003  0.002   
  (1.81)*  (1.22) (0.96) (0.25) (0.20)   
Change in terms of trade  0.149  0.136  0.136  0.100  0.094   
 (2.04)**  (1.91)*  (1.84)*  (1.77)*  (1.58)   
Coastal  dummy    0.043      
    (1.79)*      
Pop ≤ 100 km from coast     0.026     
     ( 0 . 6 7 )      
Policy     0.013     
     ( 0 . 8 6 )      
Distance  to  nearest  seaport       –0.013  –0.017 
       (0.59)  (0.80) 
Observations  100  100  100  68 68 68 
Adjusted  R-squared  0.537 0.544 0.532 0.532 0.528 0.527 
Omitting variable test p-value  0.016  0.01  0.011 0.284 0.251 0.007 
        
1995–2005        
Initial  per  capita  GDP  0.031 0.035 0.035 0.037 0.030 0.028 
 (2.67)**  (2.45)**  (1.86)*  (2.10)**  (1.24)  (1.30) 
Resource  intensity  0.003 –0.001 0.001 –0.001  –0.002   
  (0.31) (0.07) (0.09) (0.08) (0.13)   
Change in terms of trade  0.210  0.236  0.208  0.286  0.280   
  (1.34) (1.36) (1.16) (1.38) (1.28)   
Coastal  dummy    –0.019      
   –0.64      
Pop ≤ 100 km from coast     0.008     
     –0.13     
Policy     –0.019     
     –0.77      
Distance to nearest seaport          –0.02  –0.022 
        –0.53  –0.64 
Observations  50 50 50 34 34 34 
Adjusted  R-squared  0.275 0.264 0.253 0.198 0.183 0.200 
Omitting variable test p-value  0.999 0.964 0.929 0.838 0.734 0.553 
Note: Robust t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The year dummies, 
which are not reported here, are jointly significant in all the specifications. 
Considering that the geographic and policy variables vary to only a small degree in the inland 
region, in the next three regressions we use only the inland sample to take advantage of the fact that 
variations in the geographic and policy variables will not obscure regional variations of the resource 
variable within the inland region. In so doing, we can separate the geographic and policy effects from the 
resource effect to a large degree. As indicated in the results obtained using only the inland region sample   11
for the whole period (specification R4, upper panel, Table 3), the terms of trade variable appears to have a 
significant positive impact on GDP growth. When the distance to the nearest seaport is included 
(specification R5), the significance of this association between the terms of trade variable and GDP 
growth drops slightly. For the period of 1995–2005 (lower panel, Table 3), however, the coefficients for 
the terms of trade variable in R4 and R5 are not significant.   
To control for the possibility that the high correlation between the resource intensity and distance 
variables may mask the inference precisions in the last regression, we replace the resource variable with 
the distance variable. When this is done, the coefficient for the distance to nearest seaport variable is 
nonsignificant in both specifications. Overall, the initial per capita GDP has a positive coefficient in all 
the specifications when the resource variable is included, indicating a divergence in regional growth in 
both 1985–2005 and 1995–2005. However, the results showing a negative impact of resource intensity on 
GDP growth are not robust to variations in the specifications and the sample period considered.   
It has been argued that GDP growth is an imperfect welfare indicator (Bulte, Damania, and 
Deacon, 2005). In Tables 4 and 5, we examine the impact of resource abundance on per capita 
consumption growth and per capita rural consumption growth following a parallel specification, as in 
Table 3. For the whole period, the resource abundance variable is significant in specifications R1, R2, and 
R4, and marginally significant in R5. For the sub-period of 1995–2005, this variable is significantly 
negative in R1 and R4.   12
Table 4.    Per Capita Consumption Growth and Resource Abundance 
    R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 
1985–2005        
Initial per capita consumption  –0.013  –0.04  –0.043  –0.064  –0.059  –0.037 
  (0.28) (0.78) (0.79) (0.81) (0.76) (0.48) 
Resource intensity  –0.028  –0.019  –0.01  –0.031  –0.029   
 (3.11)***  (1.79)*  (0.60)  (1.82)*  (1.65)   
Change in terms of trade  0.183  0.164  0.149  0.21  0.197   
 (2.07)**  (1.78)*  (1.67)*  (1.73)*  (1.62)   
Coastal dummy    0.05         
   (1.55)         
Pop ≤ 100 km from coast      0.075       
     (1.50)       
Policy     0.015       
     (0.68)       
Distance to nearest seaport          –0.023  –0.034 
       (0.79)  (1.24) 
Observations 100  100  100  68  68  68 
Adjusted  R-squared  0.385 0.392 0.396 0.276 0.272 0.235 
Omitting variable test p-value  0.767  0.948  0.655  0.234  0.502  0.101 
           
1995–2005           
Initial per capita consumption  0.027  0.005  –0.036  0.045  0.041  0.053 
  (0.55) (0.09) (0.57) (0.65) (0.61) (0.72) 
Resource intensity  –0.022  –0.017  0.001  –0.032  –0.027   
 (2.27)**  (1.36)  (0.07)  (1.81)*  (1.45)   
Change in terms of trade  0.663  0.619  0.574  0.816  0.784   
  (2.73)*** (2.52)** (2.60)** (3.01)*** (2.83)***   
Coastal dummy    0.034         
   (0.93)         
Pop ≤ 100 km from coast      0.117       
     (2.41)**       
Policy     0.024       
     –0.79       
Distance to nearest seaport          –0.045  –0.051 
         (2.07)**  (2.51)** 
Observations  50 50 50 34 34 34 
Adjusted  R-squared  0.347 0.344 0.411 0.360 0.400 0.253 
Omitting variable test p-value 0.335  0.281  0.34  0.787  0.355  0.963 
Note: Robust t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The year dummies, 
which are not reported here, are jointly significant in all the specifications.  13
Table 5.    Per Capita Rural Consumption Growth and Resource Abundance 
    R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 
1985–2005        
Initial per capita rural consumption  –0.09  –0.131  –0.154  –0.19  –0.186  –0.127 
 (1.54)  (2.23)**  (2.87)***  (2.03)**  (2.02)**  (1.53) 
Resource intensity  –0.036  –0.027  –0.02  –0.038  –0.038   
 (3.25)***  (2.09)**  (1.15)  (1.88)*  (1.84)*   
Change in terms of trade  0.143  0.119  0.104  0.126  0.13   
  (1.63) (1.30) (1.17) (1.02) (1.03)   
Coastal  dummy   0.064        
    (1.88)*      
Pop ≤ 100 km from coast      0.081       
     (1.43)     
Policy     0.022     
     (1.00)     
Distance to nearest seaport          0.008  0.001 
       (0.25)  (0.03) 
Observations  100 100 100 68  68  68 
Adjusted  R-squared  0.249 0.264  0.26  0.151 0.138 0.114 
Omitting variable test p-value 0.205  0.87  0.866  0.19  0.116  0.104 
        
1995–2005        
Initial per capita rural consumption  –0.066 –0.121 –0.238 –0.109 –0.112 –0.037 
 (1.24)  (2.10)**  (3.61)***  (1.20)  (1.22)  (0.37) 
Resource  intensity  –0.039 –0.030 –0.020 –0.047 –0.046   
 (3.33)***  (2.39)**  (1.44)  (2.29)**  (2.25)**   
Change in terms of trade  0.769  0.683  0.728  0.761  0.758   
  (2.88)*** (2.72)*** (3.36)*** (2.54)**  (2.50)**   
Coastal  dummy   0.080        
   (2.07)**        
Pop ≤ 100 km from coast      0.159       
     (2.85)***       
Policy     0.065       
     (2.00)*       
Distance to nearest seaport          –0.006  –0.01 
       ( 0 . 2 1 )   (0.39) 
Observations  50 50 50 34 34 34 
Adjusted  R-squared  0.228 0.274 0.360 0.228 0.201 0.080 
Omitting variable test p-value  0.155 0.113 0.008 0.044 0.030 0.394 
Note: Robust t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The year dummies, 
which are not reported here, are jointly significant in all the specifications.   
For the whole sample, when both the geography and policy variables are included, the coefficient 
for the resource variable becomes nonsignificant due to the inherent multicollinearity among the three 
variables. When the regression is run on only the inland sample, the magnitude of the negative coefficient 
is larger than when the whole sample is used. To check if the negative impact of resource abundance on 
consumption growth is due to the inclusion of the geographic variable in the last equation, we repeat the   14
calculation without the resource intensity variable. The sign and significance level of the coefficient for 
the geography variable remain largely the same (specifications R5 and R6).   
Because most natural resources are produced in remote rural areas, it is interesting to investigate 
the impact of natural resources on growth in consumption by rural residents. Table 5 lists the results 
obtained when the same calculations were applied to the growth of per capita rural consumption. The 
negative coefficient for the resource abundance variable is statistically significant in all the specifications 
in which it is present, except for R3. A resource boom in rural areas does not necessarily trickle down to 
the local population and lead to consumption growth. In fact, having abundant resources may be more of 
a curse than a blessing for rural residents. Comparison of the coefficient for the resource intensity variable 
in specification R4 in Tables 4 and 5 shows that the negative impact of resource abundance on 
consumption growth is greater for rural areas than for China as a whole. This finding suggests that rural 
residents benefit less from positive resource shocks than their urban counterparts, even though they are 
physically closer to the point of production.   
The estimation results in Tables 3–5 indicate that the negative impact of resource abundance is 
more closely related to per capita consumption growth, in particular rural per capita consumption growth, 
than to per capita GDP growth. The standard of living of rural residents in resource-rich regions does not 
grow in tandem with the level of natural resource wealth.   
   15
3.    THE CHANNELS OF THE RESOURCE CURSE 
At least six transmission channels contributing to the resource curse have been put forward (Ross, 1999; 
Stevens, 2003), namely a long-term decline in terms of trade, revenue volatility, the Dutch disease, weak 
linkage with other sectors of the economy, rent-seeking behavior, and institutional quality. For a country 
relying on natural resources as a primary revenue source, a prolonged drop in real prices directly affects 
economic development. In the period of 1985–2005, the terms of trade in China favored the resource 
sector, as shown in Figure 1. Thus, worsening terms of trade can be excluded as a contributing factor. 
Because natural resource prices were fairly stable during this period, we also exclude revenue volatility as 
an explanation for the observed curse of natural resources on consumption growth.  
The last two of the six channels relate to institutions. The institution school (Bulte, Damania, and 
Deacon, 2005; Mehlum, Moene, and Tovik, 2006) posits that institutional arrangements regarding the 
distribution of resource rents have the greatest effect on welfare outcomes. The above studies use 
indicators of the rule of law and government competitiveness as measures of institutional quality. In 
China, the de jure institutional and governance structures are highly homogenous and there are no 
systematic indicators on government competitiveness (Zhang, 2006). As a consequence, we cannot 
directly use the method in the literature to directly test whether institutional arrangements in China 
contribute significantly to the resource curse. Instead, we look in-depth at the institutional arrangements 
in regard to the distribution of resource rents and examine how such arrangements may affect the outcome 
variable.  
According to the Chinese constitution, all natural resources beneath the ground belong to the 
state.
11  In the decades between the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 and the 
enactment of the Natural Resource Law in 1986, SOEs did not provide any compensation to local people 
for mining natural resources because both the enterprises and resources were owned by the state. The 
state sector enjoyed exclusive property rights on mining. Following the market reforms since the 1970s, 
the demand for natural resources went up dramatically. The monopoly mining rights granted to SOEs 
inhibited the development of this sector. It became imperative to reform the property rights arrangement, 
allow more private and foreign investment, and increase the supply of natural resources. Although the 
Mineral Resource Law was passed in 1986, it was not put into full practice until 1994 when the 
Implementation Regulations on the Mineral Resource Law were introduced.
12  Overall, from 1949 to 
1994, SOEs were the dominant players in the mining sector and the accrued rents did not necessarily 
improve local welfare.   
                                                 
11A good reference on the evolution of natural resource property rights is Zhang (2000).   
12The regulations are available at www.mlr.gov.cn/pub/mlr/documents/t20041125_74922.htm.   16
Under the new regulations, local governments were allowed to auction the development rights of 
mineral resources to the private sector, including multinational companies. Local governments were also 
permitted to explore and develop mineral resources. However, under the new regulations, SOEs still 
enjoyed preferential treatment in developing large mineral reserves. Collective enterprises and private 
investors were able to explore and develop small-scale reserves left over by the state sector. The Ministry 
of Land and Natural Resources grants permits for the exploration and mining of large-scale reserves, 
while provincial and county-level governments are responsible for issuing permits for medium- and 
small-scale reserves falling within their jurisdictions.   
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, China began a fiscal decentralization process (Zhang, 
2006). Under the new fiscal arrangements that emerged from this process, local governments have a 
strong incentive to generate more revenue. Faced with limited and mobile capital, local governments 
compete vigorously to attract new investment (Cai and Tresman, 2005). In areas with natural resources, 
selling exploration and mining rights is a quick way to create revenues. As a result, many small-scale 
mines have been privatized since 1994. However, the process of privatizing natural resources lacks 
transparency. In the absence of elections and the associated checks and balances, the interests of 
government officials may not be aligned with the interests of local residents.     
When conflicts arise between developers and local residents, the Natural Resource Law stipulates 
that mediation and resolution are the responsibility of local courts. However, local courts are not 
independent of local governments, leaving open the possibility of collusion between local courts, local 
governments and investors. Such collusion allows local governments to meet their objective of generating 
quick revenues, but may result in the unfair allocation of resource rents. When the price of a natural 
resource increases, the ambiguous property rights on natural resources may encourage rent-seeking 
behavior, to the detriment of rural residents, who usually do not have direct voices in the process. 
Although it is impossible to directly test the impact of institutional quality, useful indirect information on 
the importance of institutional arrangements governing resource rents can be gleaned by examining the 
investment and consumption patterns of governments and individuals associated with resource 
abundance. Given the framework within which resources are governed in China, we test the following 
two hypotheses: 
•  Hypothesis I: The share of investment by the state sector in total investment is positively 
related to the abundance of natural resources.   
•  Hypothesis II: The ratio of government consumption to private consumption is larger in 
resource-rich regions.   
To test the first hypothesis, the first regression presented in Table 6 examines the change in the 
ratio of private capital to SOE capital. As shown by the negative coefficient, the ratio of private capital to   17
SOE capital grows more slowly in resource-abundant regions than in resource-poor regions. This result 
supports the first hypothesis that, in resource-rich regions, most investment is made by the state sector. 
Because investment data with a breakdown by ownership is only available up to 1994/1995, we cannot 
further examine the change in the composition of private and public capital since the passing of the 
Implementation Regulations on Natural Resource Law in 1994.     
Hirschman (1958) argued that the root cause of slower growth in resource-rich economies is a 
weak linkage between resource enclaves and the rest of the economy. To test this hypothesis, ideally we 
should examine the connection between resource abundance and growth of the manufacturing sector. 
However, no systematic data is available for the manufacturing sector in China. Here we use the ratio of 
industrial GDP to overall GDP as a proxy measure of manufacturing development. However, this 
approach has the problem that the industrial GDP includes not only the manufacturing sector, but also the 
construction and transportation sectors. A resource boom may hurt the manufacturing sector, yet benefit 
the local construction and transportation sectors. As shown in Table 6, the linkage between resource 
abundance and industrial sector growth is not significant. Because of the problem inherent in this proxy 
variable, our results on the linkage between resource abundance and negative manufacturing growth are 
only suggestive. Future studies with better manufacturing data are called for. 
Based on comparative advantage, it is natural for lagging regions to focus on the resource sector. 
Provided rents are fairly distributed among local residents, governments, and business, the favorable 
terms of trade in the resource sector should have a trickle-down effect on household consumption. 
However, the estimation results in Tables 3 and 4 suggest otherwise. The question then arises: to where 
have the rents from the booming resource sector flowed?   
Under the current rule of resource rent allocation, the state sector should distribute rents fairly 
among local residents. However, if there is rent seeking behavior or if the distribution channels are 
blocked, local residents may receive a smaller share of the rising resource rents they are entitled to. 
In testing the above proposition, we examine the change in the ratio of government to household 
consumption in the GDP account by expenditure. The positive coefficient for the resource variable 
suggests that the government benefits more from the natural resource windfall than do local residents. The 
results thus offer support to hypothesis II.     
In the literature, the most commonly discussed channel of the resource curse is the Dutch disease. 
The Dutch disease model postulates that a resource boom will cause a country’s exchange rate to 
appreciate, which will make exports more expensive in the international market. The increase in the price 
of exports will, in turn, inhibit the country’s growth. In essence, the Dutch disease hypothesis refers to the 
crowding-out effect on the tradable sector in terms of higher prices. Since there is only one form of 
currency in China, the transmission channel of price impact of natural resources is not through the   18
standard exchange rate, as occurs in cross-country cases. However, there is still a potential price effect. 
As argued by Sachs and Warner (1999), positive shocks from natural resources tend to increase demand 
for non-traded goods, leading to higher overall local prices. This will in turn increase the cost of living 
and hurt the competitiveness of local businesses that produce tradable goods. 
Empirical evidence on the Dutch disease hypothesis based on cross-country data is inconclusive 
(Auty, 2001). An interesting feature of using provincial data within a country to test the hypothesis is that 
we do not need to deal with the complications arising from foreign exchange rate regimes. Because China 
does not publish the non-traded price index at the provincial level, we cannot directly test the impact of 
resource abundance on the price level of non-tradable goods. However, if we assume that the price level 
for tradable goods is similar across regions, then a higher non-traded price will be reflected in the general 
price index. In support of this assumption, transportation improvements and market reform have caused 
China’s domestic market to become increasingly integrated and prices to converge (Bai et al., 2004; Wei 
and Fan, 2004; Zhang and Tan, 2007). Therefore, the above assumption on the law of one price in the 
tradable sector appears to be reasonable.   
One potential link between resource abundance and negative economic performance is education, 
as shown in Papyrakis and Gerlaph (2007). Unlike the manufacturing sector, expansion of the resource 
sector usually does not require a highly skilled labor force, likely leading to underinvestment in human 
capital. In the next regression, we use the average years of schooling as an outcome variable.
13 The 
coefficient for the resource intensity variable is negative but nonsignificant. This may reflect the fact that 
the Chinese government has played a strong role in promoting basic education, even in the planned 
economic era. In addition, there is a long lag time in investment in human capital. Thus, any effects of 
underinvestment in human capital due to resource abundance may take decades to manifest.   
                                                 
13We also use illiteracy rate as an outcome variable. The results are similar.     19









consumption  Schooling  Price 
level 
Initial value  –0.74  –0.383  0.587  –0.104  –0.029 
 (7.65)***  (4.06)***  (7.43)***  (2.99)***  (0.31) 
Resource intensity  –0.236  0.019  0.057  –0.001  0.028 
 (3.37)***  (1.54)  (2.54)**  (0.36)  (2.06)** 
Change in terms of trade  –0.384  –0.025  –0.194  –0.003  0.042 
 (1.26)  (0.34)  (1.79)*  (0.10)  (0.71) 
Observations  45  68   68   68   68  
Adjusted R-squared  0.740  0.598  0.631  0.768  0.859 
Omitting variable test p-value 0.000 0.842  0.271  0.048  0.013 
Note: Robust t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Because the breakdown 
of fixed investment by ownership was not published after 1995, the first regression is limited up to 1995. To obtain one more 
panel from 1980 to 1985 for the first regression, we assume the total resource output by province in 1985 is the same as that in 
1980.  
In the last column of Table 6, we regress the change in general retail price level on the historical 
resource endowment conditional upon the initial price level, akin to specification R4 in Tables 3–5.
14 To 
remove regional effects, the sample includes only the inland provinces. The results show that areas with 
more intensive resource exploitation tend to exhibit a more rapid price hike, suggesting the non-traded 
price in resource intensive regions must have risen faster to offset the decline in the real price of tradable 
goods incurred through lower transportation costs and a more integrated market.
15 The  above-normal 
price levels in resource-abundant regions may cause businesses in these regions to become less 
competitive in both the domestic and international markets. In other words, the natural resource sector 
may crowd out other tradable sectors through the price effect. This finding is consistent with those of 
Sachs and Warner (2001), and provides evidence that the Dutch disease may occur even within a country.   
                                                 
14The finding still holds even after controlling for per capita consumption.   
15There are numerous news reports in Chinese on rocketing real estate prices in coal mining towns (e.g., 
www.people.com.cn/GB/news/37454/37461/2992927.html.   20
4.  CONCLUSIONS 
Despite increasing market integration and better transport infrastructure, regional inequality has risen 
significantly in China since economic reforms were initiated. This paper offers an explanation for the 
observed increase in regional inequality from the perspective of natural resource endowments and the 
mechanism governing rent allocations. China’s booming economy bids up demand for natural resources. 
In China, natural resources nominally belong to the state, and farmers have no right to a share of the rent. 
Consequently their welfare has little to do with the booming resource sector. In resource-rich regions, 
most resource rents go to the government and SOEs, crowding out private capital accumulation. Greater 
revenues from a positive resource shock tend to boost government consumption more than household 
consumption. In short, the root of the problem lies in the rules governing resource rent allocations. 
Another contribution of this paper is that it performs empirical testing of the resource curse 
hypothesis within a country. In contrast to the present work, the majority of the large body of empirical 
literature on the resource curse hypothesis uses cross-country data. The identification problem inherent in 
a cross-sectional data set makes it a daunting task to empirically test the resource curse hypothesis. Using 
panel data at the provincial level in China and estimating the sample only for inland regions, this paper 
distinguishes geographic effects from resource effects, thereby revealing the existence of a resource curse 
in terms of per capita consumption growth. The present results provide only weak support for a direct link 
between resources and GDP growth. Our findings indicate that, to a large extent, growth dividends do not 
trickle down to rural residents in resource-abundant regions. Since many of the poor live in regions rich in 
natural resources, the existence of a resource curse may help explain the recent widening regional 
inequality and stagnant poverty prevalent in resource-rich regions, in particular western China.   
The negative linkage between natural resource abundance and consumption growth suggests that 
the institutional roots of rural poverty may be deeper than previously thought. To eliminate poverty and 
reduce inequality in rural areas, it is critical to reform the property rights arrangements regarding natural 
resources. In the absence of such reform, it will be difficult to increase the income of the poor and to 
reduce the income gap by relying primarily on fiscal transfers. 
Even in the absence of the foreign exchange rate effect that forms the basis of the traditional 
Dutch disease hypothesis, a resource curse can still occur through the channel of non-traded price. 
Resource booms tend to boost non-traded prices and raise the cost of living in resource-rich regions. This 
hurts the competitiveness of manufacturing sectors.     21
With globalization, both factor and product markets become more integrated worldwide. The rise 
of emerging economies such as China and India means that demand for natural resources will likely 
continue to increase in the near future. Given that resource exports are the major revenue source of many 
severely indebted poor countries, it is important to understand the sources of the resource curse and turn 
resources into a blessing for all. Insights from Chinese provinces may assist in resolving similar problems 
affecting other poor but resource-rich countries.   22
APPENDIX 
Consumption: The per capita consumption data (at the provincial level) from 1952 to 1998 come from 
Comprehensive Statistical Data and Materials on 50 Years of New China (CNBS 1999), while 
consumption data for later years are from various issues of the China Statistical Yearbook. The 
consumption expenditures are comparable across years. For details on the construction of the data series, 
see Kanbur and Zhang (2005, Data Appendix). 
 
GDP: The real GDP growth rates, nominal GDP, household consumption, and government consumption 
prior to 1996 come from Data of Gross Domestic Product of China: 1952–1995 (CNBS) while the data 
for the period 1996–2002 are from Gross Domestic Product of China: 1996–2002 (CNBS). Data for the 
later years are from China Statistical Yearbook Using the GDP in 1985 as a base, we calculate the real 
GDP for the whole period using the comparable GDP growth rates.  
 
Geography and policy variables: The share of population within 100 kilometers of coastline and the 
policy variables are obtained from Démurger et al. (2001). The distance to the nearest seaport variable is 
from Bao et al. (2002).  
 
Population: Population data were used as weights in the calculation of the inequality measures.  Data on 
total and rural population for 1985–1998 come from Comprehensive Agricultural Statistical Data and 
Materials on 50 Years of New China (CNBS 2000), and those for 1999 onwards come from China 
Statistical Yearbook and China Agricultural Statistical Yearbook (CNBS 1999–2005). 
 
Rural poverty: The rural poverty data are from Ravallion and Chen (2007).  
 
Resources: The data for coal, hydroelectric power, oil, and natural gas are from various issues of the 
China Energy Yearbook. They are converted into standard coal using the technical conversion coefficient 
provided at the end of the yearbook.  
 
Terms of trade: The terms of trade for the resource sector are defined as the ratio of fuel price index to the 
overall consumer price index. The general consumer price index for 1985–1998 is from Comprehensive 
Statistical Data and Materials on 50 Years of New China (CNBS 1999) and for 1999 onwards is from the 
China Statistical Yearbook. The fuel price index is from various issues of the China Statistical Yearbook. 
Because the fuel price index is not available at the provincial level prior to 1985, we use the national fuel   23
price index as a proxy for each province. Considering that the fuel prices were largely under control of the 
planned economy in the early 1980s, the use of a national-level price index should have minimal impact 
on the results.  
 
Rural education. We use the percentage of rural population with different education levels to calculate the 
average years of schooling, assuming 0 years for a person who is illiterate or semi-illiterate, 5 years for 
primary-school education, 8 years for a junior high-school education, 12 years for a high-school 
education, 13 years for a professional school education, and 16 years for a college education. The data are 
from population censuses and China Rural Statistical Yearbook.    24
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